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Abstract
Industrial  countries  maintain special tariff preferences,  country's trade  policy choice, using a dataset
namely  the Generalized  System of Preferences  (GSP),  for  of 154 developing countries  from 1976 through 2000.
imports from  developing countries.  Critics have  They find that countries removed  from the GSP adopt
highlighted  the underachieving  nature  of such  more liberal trade policies than those remaining eligible.
preferences,  but developing countries  continue to place  The results, corrected for endogeneity  and robust to
the  GSP at the heart of their agenda in multilateral  numerous alternative measures of trade  policy, suggest
negotiations.  What  effect do  such preferences  have on  a  that developing countries  may be best served  by full
recipient's own  trade policies?  Ozden  and Reinhardt  integration  into the reciprocity-based  world trade regime
develop  and test a simple theoretical  model of a small  rather than continued  GSP-style special  preferences.
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contact  Paulina  Flewitt,  room  MC3-333,  telephone  202-473-2724,  fax  202-522-1159,  email  address
pflewitt@worldbank.org.  Policy Research Working Papers are also posted on the Web at http:/Iecon.worldbank.org.  The
authors may  be contacted at cozden@worldbank.org  or erein@emory.edu.  January 2003.  (33  pages)
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The United Nations  [2001] declaration that "increased trade is essential"  for the world's poor
countries  "to reap the potential  benefits  of globalization"  is a commonly shared view.  This
principle  is enshrined  in the postures industrialized  countries  and international  institutions
adopt  in  dealing  with  developing  countries.  Yet  there  is  a  lively  political  and  theoretical
debate on how best to accomplish this end.  The prevailing approach,  known as  "special and
differential  treatment", grants certain products from developing countries preferential access
to industrialized  countries'  markets  without reciprocal  liberalization  in turn.  The  General-
ized  System  of Preferences  (GSP)  is  the  leading  instrument  for  such  nonreciprocal  trade
preferences.  Advocates  contend that GSP should  "increase the export earnings,  ...  promote
the  industrialization,  and  ...  accelerate  the  economic  growth"  (GATT  [1972])  of recipient
countries.  Even now,  31  years after General Agreement  on Tariffs and Trade (GAIT) mem-
bers first  authorized  GSP  as  a  "temporary"  measure,  it remains  "highly popular"  among
developing  country beneficiaries  (Jackson  [1997]).  Strengthening  preferential  market  access
without  reciprocal  obligations  is  the  centerpiece  of the  developing  world's  agenda  in  the
current  "Development  Round"  of multilateral trade negotiations  (WTO  [1999,  2000],  Pana-
gariya  [2002a]).
For critics,  however,  nonreciprocal  preferences  like GSP are a "Faustian bargain"  (World
Bank  [1987]).  As  numerous  empirical  studies  have  demonstrated,  protectionist  forces  in
advanced  industrial  states severely  restrict  GSP  benefits.  For  instance,  such  preferences
are typically revoked  when they actually start to boost the recipients'  exports,  as shown in
Ozden  and  Reinhardt  [2002].  The  problem  is that nonreciprocal  preferences  like  GSP lie
outside the purview  of the binding GATT  legal system, so they can be unilaterally  modified
or  cancelled  by  donor countries  at  any time.  Hence,  critics  advocate  turning  developing
countries  into regular  participants who  swap trade concessions  for reciprocal  market  access
(Panagariya  [2002b];  Whalley  [1990];  Krueger  [1995]).
The theoretical  literature does not provide  answers  to this policy debate.  Starting with
the  pioneering  work of Johnson  [1953-4],  the literature  recognizes  the  efficiency-increasing
properties  of  trade  negotiations,  especially  in the  presence  of terms-of-trade  externalities.
Bagwell  and  Staiger  [1999]  show  that  rectprocal liberalization  enables  trading  partners  to
internalize these externalities and reach Pareto superior outcomes compared  to protectionist
policies.  Krishna and Mitra [2000] and Coates and Ludema [2001] construct stylized political-
economy  models  that  show  untlateral liberalization  by  a large  country  may  induce  small
developing  country  trade  partners  to liberalize  under certain  conditions.  Thus,  although
trade liberalization  is one of the most strongly  advocated development  policies,  there is no
agreement  on  whether  reciprocal  or  unilateral  liberalization  by developed  countries  would
best induce such  behavior among developing  countries.
This  paper  asks  how  nonreciprocal  preferences  such  as  GSP  affect  the  trade  policies
of  beneficiary  countries.  The  answer  is  important  for  both the policy  and  the theoretical
debate.  In  particular,  we  argue  that nonreciprocal  preferences  have  the  perverse  effect  of
2delaying  trade  liberalization  by  recipients.  That  is,  developing  countries  withdrawn  from
GSP subsequently  lower their trade barriers more than countries remaining  eligible for such
preferences.  The reason  is simple.  Governments  set trade barriers  while balancing political
support  from import-competing  and export sectors.  GSP shifts  the balance to the import-
competing  sector.  As Hudec  [1987]  observed,  "the non-reciprocity  doctrine tends to remove
the major incentive that  [developing  country]  export industries have ...  for opposing protec-
tionist trade policies  at home  ...  instead of trying to enlist the support  of the export sector
for liberal trade policy."  Furthermore,  if there is a threat of removal from the GSP program
when  its exports  increase significantly,  then the recipient  has the perverse  incentive to im-
plement  even more protectionist  policies to limit its exports  and  avoid such outcomes.  On
the other hand, if GSP  is withdrawn  and access to the export market  becomes  conditional
on its own trade policy through the reciprocity rule, the recipient  government's  optimal level
of protectionism declines.
We develop this argument using a simple two-sector  general equilibrium model of a small
country where the optimal trade policy may be influenced by political economy motivations.
This paper's chief contribution is, however,  empirical.  We provide the first extensive evidence
on  the  effects  of  the  GSP  program  on  beneficiaries'  own  trade  policies.  Specifically,  we
test  the  effects  of GSP  removal  on  beneficiaries'  trade  policies  using  a  dataset  of  annual
observations  of  154  developing  countries  since  the  United  States  started  the  program  in
1976.  We  demonstrate that countries  dropped from GSP  subsequently  adopt  lower  trade
barriers than those remaining eligible for nonreciprocal (as opposed to reciprocal)  preferences.
These  findings  control  for income, market  size,  geography,  growth,  and  other factors;  they
are  robust  to five  different  measures  of trade barriers;  and  they hold  when correcting  for
possible endogeneity of the US  GSP program.
Writing  before they  were implemented,  Harry  Johnson  argued that  nonreciprocal  pref-
erences  would fail  if developing  countries  did not  cease import  substitution  practices  that
create  "cost  disadvantages  ...  frequently  ...  far greater than the competitive  advantage that
could be conferred  by preferences  from the developed  countries"  (Johnson  [1967]).  We go one
step further,  in claiming that nonreciprocal  preferences  actually  delay removal of the very
policies Johnson said would make GSP ineffective.  To the extent that GSP's perverse  effects
are magnified by donors' protectionism,  our findings support critics who argue against unilat-
eral modification  of GSP commitments.  If increasing trade is indeed  a key to development
and  growth,  then developing  countries  would  be better  served  by abandoning  reliance  on
nonreciprocal  preferences  altogether,  becoming  members  with full  responsibilities  and  thus
rights in the world trading regime.  We accordingly conclude, with Roessler  [1998],  that "the
cause of development  was manifestly not served by releasing developing countries from their
GATT obligations."
Our results have farther-reaching  implications, especially for the future of the multilateral
trading regime.  Recent decades have witnessed the proliferation  of discriminatory  and non-
reciprocal  practices that push both the letter and the spirit of the GATT/WTO rules to their
limits.  There  can be little  doubt that GATT/WTO's twin principles  of non-discrimination
3and  reciprocity contributed  significantly  to the  success  of the multilateral  negotiations  for
trade liberalization  (Jackson  [1997]).  The place of programs like GSP in the regime  must be
rationalized  if the WTO is to continue as the basis of future liberalization efforts,  especially
those,  like  the  Doha agenda,  dealing  principally  with developing  countries.  As our  paper
shows,  these  programs damage  trade liberalization  efforts  in two distinct ways.  First,  they
prolong  protectionism  among  recipient  countries.  Second,  and more  importantly,  develop-
ing  countries  have no avenues  to protect  their rights  since these  policies  are outside  WTO
jurisdiction,  permitting donor  countries to change  these programs as they wish.
The next section outlines the main features of the GSP program and surveys some relevant
literature.  Then we provide a brief model that leads to the.conjectures tested in the empirical
section,  followed  by sections describing  the data,  the econometric  model,  and the empirical
results along with extensions.  Conclusions  follow.
2  GSP Basics
The  Generalized  System  of Preferences  is composed  of trade preferences  granted  by the de-
veloped world to developing countries  en masse on a nonreciprocal basis, i.e., without market
access concessions in return.  It was first proposed by the United Nations Conference on Trade
and Development  (UNCTAD)  during the Kennedy Round to encourage  the participation  of
developing  countries  in GATT.V  The main principle of GSP is to provide better-than-MFN
("most-favored  nation")  treatment  to imports from  qualifying  countries.  For  instance,  the
United States'  GSP program  sets a zero  tariff on 6,409 articles from beneficiary states  (out
of total 15,467 tariff lines) while other countries  face higher MFN tariffs.
GSP clashes  with two critical principles  of the multilateral trade regime (Hudec  [1987]).
The first is reciprocity,  the strategic mechanism  through which states can escape Prisoner's
Dilernma problems in trade negotiations.  The second is nondiscrimination,  the main pillar of
the regime as encoded in Article I of the 1947 GATT text.  Recognizing these inconsistencies,
GATT members approved special waivers for GSP, temporarily in 1971,  and permanently  in
1979 through the "Enabling Clause"  of the Tokyo Round agreements.  However, the Enabling
Clause  lacks  effective  guidelines  on GSP  implementation,  allowing  donors  to  design  their
schemes  "as they  see fit"  (GAO  [1994];  Hudec  [1987];  Jackson  [1997]).  In sharp contrast to
reciprocal  GATT  concessions,  "he who  giveth  may  taketh  away"  freely  in  the  context  of
GSP-conferred market  access.
The United States  was the last country  to enact  such preference  schemes,  taking effect
in  January  1976.  The  1974  Trade  Act  allows  the  President  to confer  GSP  eligibility  on
'The  US  also  administers  the  Caribbean  Basin  Initiative,  the  Andean  Community  preference,  and  a
even  more  preferential  system  in favor of  "least  developed countries,"  a subset  of the poorest  GSP-eligible
states; but GSP in 2000 covered about 75 percent  of all such US preferential imports.  The European Union
maintains  the  Lome  Convention,  a better-than-GSP  scheme  for former  colonies  in  Africa,  the  Caribbean,
and the  Pacific.
4any country except those which (a)  harbor international terrorists,  (b)  nationalize American
property without compensation,  (c)  are members of a commodity export cartel causing  "se-
rious disruption to the world economy,"  or are (d) communists (except those with permanent
normal trading status).  The law stipulates other criteria that may be used  in eligibility deci-
sions, such as (a) level of economic development,  (b) protection of workers' and human rights
and  (c)  whether  the country  receives  preferences  from other countries.  Also,  specific  prod-
ucts may be removed from eligibility if the exports exceed a certain  "competitive  need limit,"
currently  $100  million  per tariff line,  per  year,  per  country.  The President  has discretion
over when and how to apply these criteria.  In practice,  an Assistant  US Trade Representa-
tive chairs  an interagency  committee  which  makes decisions  after  reviewing  petitions  from
interested  parties  (the country  in question,  import competing  domestic  firms,  relevant  US
labor unions,  intellectual  property groups,  human rights/environmental  NGOs).  GSP eligi-
bility can be removed at the country,  product,  or country-product  level.  Out of 154 eligible
countries,  36  have  "graduated"  from the  GSP  program  since  19762  (e.g.,  Singapore,  Hong
Kong,  Taiwan,  Korea, Malaysia,  Mexico,  Botswana).  The list of major countries remaining
eligible  includes Brazil,  India,  Russia,  Indonesia,  lurkey,  South Africa,  and  Thailand.3 Be-
cause GSP  decisions  are  legally unilateral,  import-competing  lobby groups  have  effectively
made GSP the last bastion of truly unregulated  protectionism in the United States (Hudec
[1987]).
Existing  studies  of GSP  focus  on  recipients'  export  performance,  highlighting  several
common  points. First,  GSP programs  - and not just  that  of the United  States  - fail to
cover some products  in which  beneficiary  states  have the greatest  comparative  advantage,
such  as  textiles.4 In 2000,  for instance, just 47 percent  of the $175.6 billion  of US imports
from GSP beneficiaries were in tariff lines listed under the program (USITC  [2002]).  Second,
by invocation  and even more by anticipation,  the export ceilings on GSP product  eligibility
are often binding.5 Third, complexity  of the system (especially its rules of origin paperwork)
and technical  incapacity of developing  country exporters  inhibit full use of GSP preferences
even when eligibility is not a problem (UNCTAD [1999,  2001]).  Fourth, as Clark and Zarrilli
[1992] demonstrate empirically,  GSP donors disproportionately  substitute non-tariff for tariff
protection on sensitive  GSP-eligible  products.  Not surprisingly,  the universal conclusion of
numerous  empirical  studies  is that  GSP has  underperformed,  yielding  at best a  "modest"
increase in  imports from  beneficiary  states,  with some  of those  gains due  merely  to trade
diversion.6 To quote Whalley  [1990],  "available quantitative  studies  ...  seem to point to the
conclusion that special and differential  treatment  has had only a marginal  effect  on country
economic  performance,  especially through GSP."
Surprisingly,  however,  no studies  have examined  how nonreciprocal trade preferences  af-
2Being dropped  from the program is  often called  "graduation,"  because  in many  (but not all)  cases the
stated rationale  is a sufficiently high per capita income.
3Some dropped countries  were subsequently reinstated.
4WTO  [2000],  UNCTAD  [1999,  2001],  Ray  [1987],  Devault  [1996].
-5MacPhee and Rosenbaurn  [1989],  Hoekman  and Kostecki  [2001],  Finger and Winters  [1998].
6'MacPhee and Oguledo  [1991];  Brown  [1987,  1989];  Grossman  [1982];  Sapir and Lundberg  [1984].
5fect a recipient's own trade policy.  So far  this subject has been a matter of mere conjecture.
For example,  Hudec  [1987]  argues that,  by removing  "external  legal constraints,"  GSP  un-
dercuts the ability of a developing  country  leader to tie his hands when facing protectionist
pressures,  even  "making things  worse  by giving  greater  legitimacy to claims for trade pro-
tection."  Roessler  [19981  somewhat  more  cynically  agrees,  claiming  that  GSP  "provided
developing  countries with a justification  for refusing  to make market-access  conunitments."
Finger  and Winters  [1998]  likewise  observe  that  "the  wish  to  maintain  preferences  could
undermine  developing  countries' willingness  to invest in rounds of negotiated trade liberal-
ization." 
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Recent  theoretical  on the role of reciprocity  recognizes  its efficiency  increasing  proper-
ties.  Specifically,  Bagwell and Staiger [1999] argue that reciprocal liberalization enables large
trading partners to internalize  the terms-of-trade  externalities  inherent in multilateral  trade
negotiations, enabling them to reach Pareto superior outcomes.8 A second set of papers asks
whether  unilateral liberalization by  a large country  can cause  a small country to liberalize
as well.  Krishna and  Mitra [2000]  and Coates  and Ludema  [2001],  in particular, emphasize
political  economy  mechanisms  through  which  the  large  country's  unilateral  liberalization
modifies the lobbying  game  inside the smaller  country and  induces  liberalization.  Hence,
in terms of the large country's  policy choice,  the contrast  for Bagwell  and Staiger  [1999]  is
between protectionism and reciprocal liberalization,  while for the latter papers it is between
protectionism  and unilateral  liberalization.  To evaluate  the effects  of GSP in  a world oth-
erwise  dominated  by GATT-based reciprocity,  however,  the appropriate  contrast is between
unilateral and  reciprocal liberalization,  from the  standpoint  of a developed  state  vis-a-vis
developing country imports.  We develop  a simple model to this end in the next section.
3  Model
We consider an import and an export sector in a small country whose trade policies can only
influence  domestic  prices but not world prices.  All variables related to the import  (export)
sector  are  identified  by the superscript  m  (x).  The  domestic  price  of the  import good  is
denoted by pm and its foreign market  price by pT.  Similar variables  (pZ  and px,)  are defined
for the  export  good.  Variable p = pm/pX  (P,  = pT/pw)  is the relative  price  ratio faced  by
consumers  and producers  in the domestic (world)  market.  Furthermore,  p,,.  is the inverse of
the terms of trade for the small country.
We assume that the only policy tool available to the government is the tariff (or the sub-
sidy)  on the import good.  This might seem  restrictive  but, in general equilibrium settings,
7See  also Nowzad  [1978];  Michalopoulos  [1999]  .
8McLaren  [1997]  provides  an  interesting  model  highlighting  the  importance  of commitment  to  trade
liberalization  in the  presence  of sunk costs.  One of the benefits  of reciprocal  liberalization  under  GAIT is
this  commitment  value.
6the Lerner symmetry theorem  allows  us to focus only on the trade policy in one sector.  Im-
port policies are certainly more common in practice.  We express the trade policy parameter
as t, which  is  one  plus the  non-prohibitive  ad  valorem  tariff rate  in the domestic  market.
This implies p = tpw, since pZ  = pZ.  We further have that dp/dt > 0 and Op.OIt = 0,  since
this is a small  country.
Production  of the import  and  the  export  goods  in  this  country  is  characterized  by  a
production  possibilities frontier.  The domestic price ratio p determines the marginal rate of
transformation and the production levels (QX  (p) and Qm(p))  of the two goods.9 The demand
functions  Dm (p, T) and D'  (p, T) are also determined  by the domestic price ratio p and the
overall tariff revenue T, which is distributed to the consumer.  Tariff revenue is a function  of
domestic  and world prices, which makes domestic demand a function of these as well.  Next
we  impose  a balanced  trade  constraint:  Pw  [Din (Ppp)  - Qrn (p)]  =  [Qm(p) - Dm (p,  p.)]-
Thus,  the exogenous world price Pw and the tariff rate t determine the domestic  price level
p,  and this, in turn,  determines  the demand and supply levels  of both goods as well  as the
tariff revenue.lU
Government  preferences  are represented  through  a very general objective  function that
depends on endogenous domestic  and exogenous  world prices  as parameters,  following Bag-
well  and Staiger  [19991:  G (p,pw) = G (p (t,pW) ,Pw)  . This is somewhat  different  than the
norm in most papers,  where the  objective  is  a simple function  of the tariff rate,  but there
is no loss of generality.  We  impose the restriction that the improved  terms of trade lead  to
higher welfare  for the government  when the domestic prices  are fixed:  9G (p, p,,) /lPw  < 0. 11
This structure is quite general:  most models  of trade policy formation'2 can  be represented
this way.
The optimal trade policy  tP  is given by the first order condition:
dGdp
dp dt
We  assume  that  the  second  order  condition  is  satisfied:  Gpp  <  0.  We  should  note  that
the  optimal  policy  is  free  trade  (t  =  1)  in  most  models  regardless  of world  prices  if the
government  were to maximize social welfare.  The presence  of positive  tariffs  (t > 1)  implies
that political economy  motivations  are in  place.  The optimal  trade policy  might also  be a
function of exogenous world prices  pw*
9The production  possibilities  frontier  can  be derived  from  a specific  factors  model in which  each  sector
employs two factors.  One of these factors  (capital)  is sector-specific  and is  supplied in fixed quantities while
the other (labor) is mobile.  An increase in the price of the import good (and thus an increase in p)  increases
the demand  for labor employed  in that sector and the wage  which, in turn,  decreases  the profit  level in the
export sector.  This structure is quite different  than the ones found in some papers  (such as  Grossman  and
Helpman  [1994])  where labor is assumed to be in excess supply and to have a constant price so that are there
are no production externalities  between sectors.  This  model is presented in more detail in an earlier version
of the paper.  It is available upon  request.
lf)For  a more detailed version  of this setting,  see Bagwell and Staiger  [19991.
We should note that Pw  is the inverse  of the terms of trade  given the way  we defined our  variables.
12Grossman  and  Helpman  [1994]  and see Rodrik  [1995] for  an extensive  survey.
73.1  Granting  GSP
What happens to  t*  when the small  country receives  nonreciprocal  preferences?  The GSP
status granted  by the United States and other developed  countries allows a developing  coun-
try to export its goods to these markets without the regular tariffs applied to other suppliers.
This special  treatment  increases the price  exporters from GSP-eligible  countries  receive for
their  products,  because  the  GSP donor  markets  are  big  enough  to affect  the  world  prices
through their trade policies.  In other words,  being included  in the GSP program is equivalent
to an increase  in the exogenous  variable  pX  or a decline  in Pw  in our model."3 If we totally
differentiate  the first order  condition  (1),  we obtain dt*ldp  = - (Gppt + GpPj)  /Gppp  or
sign  (d  )  = stgn  (Gppt + Gpp.)
We know that  Gpp < 0 but the sign of Gppw  is ambiguous  and,  actually,  in most  models,  it
is positive.  Thus  the impact  of the initial  conferral  of GSP  (a decline  in Pm)  on the small
country's optimal trade policy  (t*)  is also ambiguous;  it depends  on the details of the model
at  hand.  Note that the baseline  for  comparison  here  is a unilaterally  protectionist  regime
by the large,  donor state.
A  decline  in  pw, (or  increase  in p,)  is  equivalent  to  unilateral  liberalization  by  a large
country,  and  this is  analyzed  in  the models  by  Krishna  and Mitra  [2001]  and  Coates  and
Ludema  [2001].  They show that,  under certain assumptions  about the  underlying political
economy framework,  this causes the small country to liberalize.  Our simple scenario, on the
other  hand,  states that it  is not  possible  to  derive  unambiguous  results  about  the impact
of a movement  from a  unilaterally  protectionist  regime to a unilaterally  liberal  regime  by
large  countries.  That  is,  our  generic  model  highlights  the  sensitivity  of  their  results  to
assumptions about the domestic political economy setting.  However, that is not this paper's
main  concern;  rather,  we  aim  to compare  unilateral lzberalhzat%on  (via GSP)  to  reczprocal
lzberalizatzon (as in GATT/WTO).  And, in this respect, the results are more clear.
3.2  Imposing Reciprocity
Reciprocity  has always been one of the most important norms  of GATT negotiations.  The
general  principle  of reciprocity  requires  countries  to  lower their  tariff rates and other  trade
barriers  together,  at least  roughly balancing  the market  access  concessions  offered  by other
members.  Thus Pareto  efficient  outcomes  can be achieved  compared to the inefficiencies  of
unilateral tariff choices.  The methods of implementing  reciprocity and assessing the balance
'3Note that  p_  is actually  the terms of trade  faced  by  exporters  and  importers  trading  with the  large
country.  In the absence  of GSP this  is identical to the actual  world  price.  However,  under GSP the terms
of trade differ  from the actual  world price,  as these firms do not  have to pay tariffs  due to their  preferential
status.
8of concessions  have changed  from one  GATT  round  to the next,  but the general  principle
has prevailed since the first days  of GATT (Hoekman  and Kostecki  (2001]).
Once a country  "graduates"  from GSP, it is no longer  eligible  for the (positive)  discrim-
inatory  treatment  and  duty-free  access to the US market.  Furthermore,  if the  graduating
country  wants  to receive  the  MFN tariffs  granted  by the United  States  to its other WTO
partners,  it may be compelled  to reciprocate  by  lowering  its own barriers to imports, espe-
cially for those coming  from the US.  In other words,  the principle  of reciprocity  imposes  a
conditionality  on the export prices of the developing country in terms of the domestic  prices
of its imports.  We represent  this conditionality  in very general terms  as pX  = f  (pm)  where
f/  < 0.
We  must  emphasize,  however,  that  we  are  not  offering  a  positive model  of the  donor
state's  decision to impose  such  reciprocity.  Indeed,  the  incentives  for  the US  to demand
such reciprocity may decline with the market size of a GSP beneficiary.  On the other hand,
there are many other economic or institutional reasons to the demand for reciprocity  by the
US as well.  Our claim here thus addresses the consequences  of a policy  change by the GSP
donor state.
Returning to the model,  we see that the reciprocity rule implies that a higher  domestic
tariff rate t on the import goods leads to lower export prices pX  and worsened terms of trade
p.  Under reciprocity,  the objective function  of the government  becomes
G (P,  PW) =G  (PM)  P.  ))
where  pm =  tpm.  The  tariff rate  is  again the  only  decision  variable  for the  government.
However,  unlike the previous section,  the tariff rate chosen  by the government  influences  pX
and, therefore,  the domestic price ratio p and the terms of trade p1. The first order condition
of the objective function under the reciprocity  rule is
[1 - fp] Gp  - f'p.Gp.  = 0
We know that  Gp,,  < 0 and  f'  < 0,  which imply Gp =  lf'P-,GpW  > °.
The  critical  question  is whether  the  withdrawal  of GSP  (and  the  attendant  shift  to
reciprocity) leads to a lower equilibrium tariff rate t. To answer this question, let PGsp denote
the export prices  under the GSP  program,  tRBC  (t*sp) be the equilibrium  tariff rate under
reciprocity (GSP), and pT be identical under the GSP regime and the reciprocity rule.  Then,
suppose the tariff rate  chosen under  the reciprocity rule leads to the same  export  prices as
the GSP regime.  In other words,  the developing  country government  chooses tariffs so that
it receives  the same tariffs on its exports  as it did under  GSP:  f  (tRECPT) = PREC = PGSP-
Therefore,  the export  prices px  (and  hence  the terms  of trade  p,w,)  are the same under  the
two regimes,  but the import  prices pm (and therefore  domestic prices  p)  might be different
due to differences  between the equilibrium tariff rates tREC and t*,.  But we have Gp  > 0
9in equilibrium  under the reciprocity  rule, while  Gp =  0  under  GSP. This implies that PREC
and PREC are  lower  than PGsp and PGSP, respectively,  since  G is a  concave  function of p,
and pZ is the same under the two regimes.  The next statement  summarizes this result.
Conjecture  1  Suppose the  reczprocity rule leads to  the  same  world pmces for the export
good x  (i.e.,  yielding the same tamffs from the  United States) as the GSP regzme.  Then the
equilibrium tamff implemented under the reczprocsty rule zs  lower than the one implemented
under GSP.
This conjecture  states that removing  a developing country's eligibility for GSP, and thus
giving  market  access  only  in exchange  for  reciprocal  tariff reductions,  indeed  induces  the
developing country  to reduce its import barriers.  The reciprocity rule compounds the costs
- by lowering  export  prices  - of the  developing  country's  decision  to maintain  higher
tariffs.  This  increase  in  the marginal cost  of tariffs  lowers their  equilibrium  level.  In other
words,  if a developed  country  liberalizes  its trade  policies reciprocally,  within the scope  of
the GATT/WTO  regime,  it will  induce more  liberalization  by developing  countries than if
it had liberalized unilaterally,  as under GSP.  Removing a beneficiary from GSP should thus
cause it to adopt more liberal trade policies.
4  Data and Variables
This section tests the hypothesis that countries dropped from the GSP program adopt more
liberal  import  policies  than those  remaining  on  GSP.  We  construct  a  dataset  with  one
observation per year per independent developing country,  from its first year as a United States
GSP  beneficiary  (minimum  1976,  the start  of the  program)  through  2000.  Our  definition
of "independent"  follows the official US GSP  manuals (e.g.,  USTR  [19991).14  This yields a
total of 154 countries  and 3210 country-years  in the panel.
We previously noted that most developed  countries maintain their own versions  of GSP.
If our hypothesis  is correct, all  of these programs should have an impact on developing coun-
try trade policies,  weighted perhaps by the significance  of the industrialized nation's market
for the exports of the country in question.  However, we have data on only the United States'
GSP program.  This is no great  loss,  because the overall margin of preference  conferred  by
the US GSP  program  is by most accounts  fundamentally  comparable  to the preferences  of
the European Union  and other developed  countries  (GAO  [2001],  UNCTAD  [1999]).  Fur-
thermore, the US GSP-authorizing  law stipulates that the President may base GSP eligibility
1'Following  the  US  GSP  program  guidelines  cited  earlier,  most  OPEC  members  and  members  of the
communist  bloc  were  never  granted  GSP  eligibility  (until  they  experienced  a regime  change),  with some
exceptions,  namely,  Angola,  Ethiopia,  Grenada,  Laos,  Madagascar,  Mozambique,  Nicaragua,  Romania,  and
Yugoslavia  (communist  regimes)  and Indonesia,  Nigeria, and Venezuela  (OPEC members).  The others are
thus not in our sample,  which only includes  a state from its first year on the GSP program.
10decisions on "the extent to which other major developed countries are undertaking a compa-
rable effort,"  i.e., extending GSP preferences  of their own to the country in question  (USTR
[1999]).  Thus,  different GSP programs  are correlated"5 and the measurement  of GSP status
here, while technically  representing the US program only, offers  a reasonable approximation
of all developed country  preferences  for developing  countries.
4.1  Key Variables
GSP Status.  The dummy variable  GSP,,t is 1 if country i was a United States  GSP benefi-
ciary  in year t;  0 otherwise"6. This information was collected from USTR [1991]  and Federal
Register [various].  The GSP dummy admittedly glosses over important distinctions between
countries with widely-varying amounts of actual  US GSP benefits.  In order to capture that
variation,  we also construct the variable  GSP Fraction,,t,  defined as country i's GSP exports
to the US  (USITC  [2002])  as  a percent  of its total exports in year t (World Bank  [2001b]).
Unfortunately,  this  variable is  available only for the last decade,
17 so we  use  GSP Practzon
for sensitivity testing only.
Trade Polzcy Measures.  Available  data on aggregate  national trade  protection  are  no-
toriously  imperfect.  Our  strategy  is  redundancy:  if we  obtain  similar  findings  with each
of the  several  most  frequently  used  measures  of trade  policy,  our inferences  will be  more
robust.  The most common  method of measuring protectionism  is to examine  trade  flows,
not policy,  in the form of trade volume divided by GDP, mainly because of data availability.
Accordingly,  our variable  Closure,,t is country i's total imports as a percent  of GDP in year t.
This is subtracted  from zero to make  higher values  represent greater import restrictiveness,
yielding  a sample  mean  of -46.  It has the  virtue of capturing  the effect  of non-tariff as
well  as  tariff barriers.  However,  as  many have  argued  (e.g.,  Dollar  and  Kraay  [2001]  and
Rodrfguez  and  Rodrik  [2001]),  trade  openness  reflects  not just  polzcy  but  also  geography
and market  size (though  we control  on the right hand  side for these factors).  Among the
measures which reflect  policy more directly,  we adopt  Dutiesq,t (duties as a percent of total
trade, from World Bank  [2001b])  and  Tariff,t (the unweighted  average  nominal  tariff, from
World  Bank  [2001a]).  These  variables  average  9.4  and  20.6,  respectively,  in  our dataset.
Rodrfguez  and Rodrik  [2001]  make  a strong case for Duties as the best  of an imperfect  lot,
since  Tariff weights  policies  on small-volume  products  like golf putters  the same as  tariffs
on automobiles.  However, because highly protected industries have fewer imports (and thus
fewer duties),  Duttes understates  protection  levels.  Below we  estimate models  using these
I5For instance,  the US announced the withdrawal  of Malaysia from its GSP program in October 1996,  and
the European  Union followed  suit in 1997 by slashing eligibility  for all of Malaysia's chief exports (palm oil,
plastics,  rubber,  wood,  clothing, consumer  electronics,  and all agricultural  products),  if not cutting it from
the program formally.
16The GSP eligibility of Pakistan and Argentina  was  halved in the late 1990s;  we code  this as withdrawal
of GSP.
1 7Earlier data on GSP imports by country  are disaggregated  by  10-digit product  code,  by customs  entry
point,  by month, and available only in microfiche form.
11three  dependent  variables  separately.  Because  data on  all three  are missing  for  a sizable
portion  of the country-years  in the overall  dataset  (13,  52,  and 73  percent  missing,  respec-
tively),  the dependent  variable  is the greatest  constraint  on the size of the samples used  in
these regressions.1 8
Bzvanate Associattons.  If the hypothesis  is correct,  then countries on  GSP  should be
more  protectionist  (with higher  Dutzes,  Tariff, and  Closure) than countries  dropped from
GSP.  In Figure  1,  which  displays  averages  across  all country-years  in the sample,  on and
off GSP, we see this is indeed true.  The average ex-GSP recipient,  compared to the average
beneficiary,  has  less than  half the nominal  tariff and  duties,  and  imports  nearly  9 percent
more of its GDP per  year.  This association  is evident  for the continuous  measure of GSP
benefits as well.  For  example,  the correlation  between  GSP Fraction,,t and  Tarnff,,t is 0.15
(p < 0.001, n = 572).  Of course, these simple summaries  are by no means definitive,  since
they fall to control for alternative explanations  of trade policy, but they nonetheless  indicate
the association of developing  country  protectionism with GSP.
4.2  Control Variables
Trend.  Virtually  all developing  countries have  liberalized  their trade  policies  significantly
over the course of the past decade or two.  Since 36 countries have been dropped from the US
GSP program  over  time,  a positive correlation  between  GSP withdrawal  and liberalization
could result from this secular  trend alone.  To isolate GSP's impact from the secular trend,
we include the variable  TRendt,  i.e., the mean  of the (relevant)  dependent variable across  all
countries in the dataset  in year  t.19
Condstionality.  Many developing  countries  in this time period  have experienced  acute
financial crises,  and, in most cases, sought  assistance  from the International Monetary  Fund
(IMF),  whose conditionality  terms typically include  trade liberalization.  Compliance  with
IMF  conditionality  is  seriously  lacking  on average  (e.g.,  IMF  [1998]  and Goldstein  [2000]).
Rodrik  [1994]  similarly argues that trade liberalization in the developing world has not been
driven  by pressure from  international  financial institutions.  Nonetheless,  to control for  this
potential  cause of freer trade policies,  we include  the variable  IMF,,t,  a dummy which  is  1
if an  ongoing IMF  program  is underway  in country  i in year  t  (Vreeland  [2002]),20  and  0
otherwise.  IMF  programs were  underway  in about  38  percent  of the  country-years  in the
dataset.
Market Size.  Countries  with  larger markets  may be  more diversified  and  thus have  a
smaller proportion of GDP involved in trade.  Hence we introduce a control for (the natural
18Testifying to the importance of redundancy for this analysis,  the three measures are not highly correlated
For Dutzes,t  and  Tariff,,t, r  = 0.37  (n =  542);  Dut%es,,t and  Closure,,t, r  =  0.13  (n =  1540);  Tanff,,t  and
Closure,,t, r = 0.42  (n =  864).
"9We thank Jagdish  Bhagwati for suggesting the inclusion  of this variable.
2('Thanks to Jim Vreeland for the most current update  of his dataset  of IMF program participation.
12log of)  country i's market  size in year  t,  Log  GDPi,t (in  constant  1995  US dollars),  which
should affect Duties, Tariff, and  Closure in line with conventional  expectations.
Income.  Income  is one of the most important  determinants  of trade flows,  if not trade
policies2 ".  High income is also a statistically significant predictor  (though not the only one)
of removal  from US  GSP  eligibility  (Ozden and  Reinhardt  [2002]).  In order  to limit  the
potential for spurious inference about the effects of GSP,  we control for  Log Income,,t (using
per capita GDP in constant  1995 US dollars).2 2
Geography.  A country's distance from important suppliers  and markets affects transport
costs  and  thus trade  levels,  as  gravity  model  studies  have  repeatedly  shown  (Leamer  and
Levinsohn  [1995]).  In addition, such geography-induced  transport  costs may serve  as a sub-
stitute for policy-created  import  barriers.  In contrast  to the usual  pairwise gravity  model,
however,  we control for location using a country-specific  geographical indicator.  Specifically,
Gallup and Sachs  [1999]  give the proportion of a country's population that lives more than
within  100 kilometers of a coast or navigable  river  (here,  Landlocked,)  - though their data
are  not  time-varying.  The proportion  of "landlocked"  population  in the dataset's  average
country is 0.39.
Growth.  The business cycle  is often said  to affect  trade policy.  Protectionist  pressures
are  often greatest  during  economic  downturns  (Dornbusch  and  Frankel  [1987]  and  Rodrik
[1995]).  Yet severe recessions also may catalyze reform,  while prolonged growth may retard
it  (Rodrik  [1994]).  For that  reason,  we  control  for real  GDP growth  (Growth 1,t)  in  our
analyses  (World Bank [2001b]).
5  Econometric  Models
We estimate several sets of regressions,  comparing countries  still eligible to those withdrawn
from  the  US  GSP  program.  The first  set  (models  1,  2,  and  3)  concerns  GSP  status  as
a  dummy  variable,  thereby  permitting  use  of the  entire  1976-2000  period.  We  lag  all
explanatory  variables  by one year  (except  Landlocked) as  a first-cut  method  of addressing
concerns  about  endogeneity.23 For robustness,  we estimate the same model  separately  for
each of the three primary measures of the dependent variable.  Hence, if Yi,t  is either Duties,t,
Tarnff,,t, or Closure,,t for country i in year t then the estimated equation is
Y.Nt  =  Ce +  51 GSPI,- 1 + ,62 Rhendt.I + 83 3IMF,,t-1 + 14 (Log  GDP1,t-1)  (2)
+135  (Log Income,,t-)  + /B6Landlocked, + / 7Growth,,t-j + e,,t.
21According to Baier and Bergstrand  [2001],  it is the most important deterninant.
22The  source for GDP and per capita GDP  figures is World  Bank [2001b].
23We  set  GSP,,t,1 = 1 for  each  country's  first year  in our dataset.  (Recall that the sample  begins  the
first year a country is eligible  for GSP.)
13Due  to the  cross-sectional  time-series  nature  of the  data,  heteroscedasticity  and  autocor-
relation  are  likely.  A  common  estimation  approach  in  this  setting  is  feasible  generalized
least  squares  (GLS)  with contemporaneous  error correlation,  groupwise  heteroscedasticity,
and first-order  unit-specific  autocorrelation  (e.g.,  Greene  [2000]).  However,  GLS  assumes
we know the true error  covariance  matrix,  the basis of the FGLS transformation.  Because
there are N x  (N + 1)/2 contemporaneous  covariances  (where N is the number of countries
in the panel),  and because unit-specific  serial correlation  draws on just one country's string
of observations,  good estimates of the error covariance  matrix demand many more years per
country  than countries themselves.  Using  Monte  Carlo simulation,  Beck  and Katz  [1995]
demonstrate,  in precisely the situation our analysis faces,24 FGLS standard errors  dramati-
cally understate true variability,  whereas  OLS with appropriately  corrected standard  errors
is less efficient  but consistent  (see also  Greene  [2000]).  Hence we estimate equation  2 with
OLS,  reporting Newey-West  standard  errors robust to heteroscedasticity  and first-order  au-
tocorrelation  (e.g.,  Greene  [2000]).25  Recall  that  31  should  be  positive in  each version  of
the equation,  using Dutzes,  Tamff,  and  Closure.  Table  1 displays descriptive  statistics  for
the regression samples.
5.1  Estimation  Results
The results strongly  support  our hypothesis  that removing  GSP induces  liberalization.  In
every  model,  GSP  is  a  statistically  significant  determinant  of protection,  with  a  powerful
substantive impact as well.  These findings are robust to a wide variety of sensitivity analyses.
Table  2  shows  the  full-sample  OLS  estimates  of  the  Duties,  Tariff, and  Closure equa-
tions (models  1,  2,  and  3).  All models fit  the data well,  as  evidenced  by the tables'  model
test statistics.  Adjusted  R2s  in the OLS  models  lie  between  0.31  and  0.41.  Diagnostics
indicate  heteroscedasticity  and  first-order  serial  correlation.26 Hence  the more  conserva-
24We have  more than a hundred  cross-sections  but,  after  missing data,  at best no more than  19 years per
country
25We  do  not include  error  components.  The  random  effects  assumption  that  country-specific  random
errors  are uncorrelated  with the regressors is clearly not appropriate,  given the concerns  about endogeneity.
Moreover,  most variation  in the dependent  variables  and in GSP  is cross-sectional  rather than longitudinal
- variation that is at the heart of our  analysis but which  would be obscured  by country-specific  dummies
In model  2's  Tariff regression  sample,  for  instance,  55  of the  111  countries  have  5 or  fewer  observations
each.  Rather than subsume such cross-national  variation with dummies, we control for the most important
theoretically-justified  cross-sectional  factors,  like  market  size,  income,  and geography,  adding appropriately
conservative  standard  errors.  The  first-difference  technique  is often suggested  as  an  alternative  to  error
components  in  cases  like  this,  but  here  it is inappropriate  because  GSP  is a  dummy  which  very  rarely
changes  (36  times  out of  our  3210 observations)  and  whose  greatest  effects  are  felt  over a long  stretch  of
subsequent  years,  not just one year following  removal  (e.g.,  Wooldridge  [20021).  One  solution,  however,  is
a before-and-after  test,  looking  solely  at those countries  ultimately  dropped;  we report  the results  of this
robustness test below.
26Specifically,  for  OLS models  1, 2, 3, White's general test rejects homoscedasticity  with p < 0.01  in each
case (Greene [2000]).  Regression of OLS residuals  -,,t  on E,,t-l yield estimates of first-order  serial correlation
14tive, heteroscedastic-  and autocorrelation-consistent  Newey-West  standard  errors are indeed
appropriate.  Correlations  among  the  independent  variables  are very  low  in  most  cases,
moderate  in just a few,27 and never higher than 0.5; multicollinearity  is not a problem.  Be-
cause the conventional  GLS  approach  is more efficient  but, as noted above,  becomes  biased
in  wide but  short  panels  like ours  (Beck  and  Katz  [1995]),  we  conduct  Hausman  tests  of
the appropriateness  of the consistent but less efficient estimator,  OLS.  Such tests reject the
equivalence  of OLS and GLS coefficients  with p < 0.01  (for models  1,  2, 3,  and 7), validating
the use of OLS despite  its lower efficiency.  Of course,  inefficiency  simply  raises the bar for
our hypothesis  tests.
Consider  the  OLS  estimates  in  Table  2.  Just  as  expected,  the coefficient  of  GSP is
positive and significant  for all three dependent  variables  (models  1, 2, and 3).  When  other
factors are held constant,  a GSP recipient has average duties 1.66 points higher as percent  of
trade  (model  1)  and average tariffs higher by 3.83 percent  (model 2).  Furthermore,  its total
imports are 8.5  points lower as percent  of GDP (model  3).  These numbers imply that GSP
recipients  are  roughly  15-20  percent  more  protectionist  than countries  no  longer  eligible,
because these differences  are about  one-sixth to one-fifth of the means of these trade policy
measures  (Table 1).  Had Costa Rica hypothetically been dropped from GSP in 2000,  model
3 predicts it would have imported  $8.6 billion instead of $7.3 billion that year.
Of course,  the comparison here is between countries removed from GSP, on one hand, and
the same countries before removal,  plus all countries  never dropped from GSP, on the other.
If the countries ultimately dropped  are systematically  different from those never dropped,  in
some unobservable  way,  our inference about  GSP's effect might be tainted.  To confirm that
our results are not  affected  by such bias,  we re-estimated  models  1, 2,  and  3 using  only the
36 countries ultimately dropped from GSP.  In  every case,  the  coefficient  for GSP  was  still
positive  and significant.  Even those  countries ultimately dropped  were more  protectionist
when they were eligible  for GSP,  controlling  for other factors  as well.  Similarly,  the GSP
findings in  models  1,  2,  and  3 do  not  change  if we  add  dummies  for World  Bank-defined
regions.28
We should note that, among the control variables,  income level is significant in all models.
The trend in liberalization across the developing world is significant  in the Dutzes and  Tarqff
models while total GDP is significant  in the Tariff and Closure models,  all with the expected
signs.  On the other hand, IMF and Landlock are not significant  in any of the models.
of about p = 0.8, p < 0.01,  for all four  OLS models  as well.
27Depending on the model  and sample in question,  Log Income,,ti, exhibits a correlation  with IMF,,t-l
of about  -0.25,  with Log  GDP,,t-l of about 0.35, and with Landlocked,  of roughly -0.50.
2 "Results  available upon request.
155.2  Endogeneity  of GSP
The second set of regressions addresses the potential for endogeneity of GSP status.2 9 This is
a critical issue, though indeterminate  as to direction.  Granting and removing GSP eligibility
is,  after all,  a political decision.  In particular,  endogeneity  may arise if a recipient's  import
policy affects the United States removal  decision.  On one hand, if US exporters (rather than
primarily US import-competing  producers)  influence the decision, then beneficiary countries
with high  trade barriers  of their own  would  be  prime targets  for removal.  This suggests
GSP  recipients  may  be  more,  not  less,  open  to imports  than ex-beneficiaries.  If so,  the
estimates  from the first  set of regressions  may be conservative.  On the other hand, the US
may be  most likely to maintain GSP eligibility for precisely those countries that have failed
to overcome the legacy of import substitution, because they have prospered the least and are
in greatest  apparent need of foreign  aid.  This implies GSP should be associated  with worse
policies  (e.g.,  high  trade barriers), just  as  we  have proposed  - but for  a different  reason.
If true,  the results  from our  OLS  regressions  may  overstate GSP's  effect.  Either way,  we
must explicitly  address potential endogeneity  bias in order to have greater  confidence  in our
findings.  However,  we emphasize that this paper makes no claim about the direction of the
reverse causality.  Rather, the point is simply to see whether  GSP still independently  affects
import policies  even in a model that acknowledges  its endogeneity.
We use an instrumental variables  (IV) approach  to isolate the  "treatment  effect"  of GSP
on trade policy when the treatment itself is endogenous.  That is, imagine a prior equation,
GSPt  =  'x%t-1 +  Uz,t  (3)
where  GSP,,t =  1 if GSP*t  >  0 but  0  otherwise,  and x  is a vector of instruments  thought
to be uncorrelated with E in equation (2).  Because  of the discrete nature of GSP, the usual
2SLS  instrumental  variables  method  may  overstate  the coefficient  estimates.  Instead,  we
use the well-known  "treatment  effects"  instrumental  variables  (IV)  approach,  much  like a
Heckman selection model  but with observed trade policy outcomes  even for those countries
not  receiving  the  "treatment"  (GSP).  This  model  assumes  E,,t  in  (2)  and  u,,t  in  (3)  are
correlated,  and we estimate it using maximum likelihood (Greene  [2000, 933-934]).  We thus
use  values of GSPt,t (not GSP,,t-.,  since  we are correcting  for simultaneous  causation  here)
fitted from a first-stage probit regression as the optimal instrument for GSP,,t in equation (2).
Models  4,  5,  and  6 separately  apply  this  method to Dut%es,  Tarff, and  Closure, paralleling
models  1, 2,  and  3, reporting traditional  heteroscedastic-consistent  standard  errors.
The decisive issue is exogeneity  of the instruments.  Fortunately,  as Ozden and Reinhardt
[2002]  demonstrate,  there are  a  number of good predictors  of US  GSP  eligibility;  many  of
these  have no conceivable  direct link to the developing  country's own trade policy.  These
include (a)  a dummy  denoting the presence of other foreign policy sanctions imposed by the
US on  country  230;  (b)  capitol-to-capitol  distance  from  country  i to the  United  States,  in
29We thank  Caroline Freund for suggesting  these additional  tests.
30Institute  for International  Economics  [2000];  Office  of Foreign Assets Control  [2002])
16miles;  (c) a dummny indicating country i maintains a formal alliance with the United States31;
(d) the percent of all once-eligible  developing  countries still on the US GSP program; and (e)
the US GDP growth rate  (World Bank [2001b]);  (f) a sufficiently lagged value of GSP status
itself.  All  are measured  for year t - 1, except the last, which  is for year  t - 3.  The US is
likely to remove GSP status when it also employs national security sanctions against a target
country,  a criterion even written into the GSP-authorizing  statute.  Yet  such sanctions  are
not  directly  related  to  the  country's  own import  policy.  Likewise,  distance  and  alliance
status affect a country's trade with the United States in particular but not its import policy
overall.  US macroeconomic  conditions affect  the pressure from domestic import-competing
industries to remove many significant exporting nations from GSP but have little or no effect
on the target  country's  own import barriers.  We avoid concerns  about  endogeneity of the
lagged GSP instrument by setting the lag sufficiently deep.  While all results we report below
are valid  without the use of the  GSPi,t.3 instrument,  it increases the explanatory  power  of
the first-stage  IV regression,  and the use of stronger instruments  has been  shown to reduce
IV bias  (e.g.,  Staiger  and Stock [1997]).  We include  these instruments,  in  addition to  the
right-hand-side variables in 2,  in the x vector in equation 3.  We verify that our instruments
are properly  exogenous  (i.e.,  not correlated  with E  in 2):  tests of overidentifying  restrictions
in IV models 4, 5, 6 (and 8)  all fail to reject the null of exogeneity  (Davidson and MacKinnon
[1993]).32
Table 3 presents the IV estimates of the Duties, Tariff and Closure equations (models 4, 5
and 6).  GSP's  coefficient  is highly statistically significant  and in the hypothesized  (positive)
direction  in  each  column.3 3 Indeed,  the  coefficients  from  the  IV  estimation  are  slightly
higher  than  the  respective  values  in  the  OLS  estimation.  (What  this  implies  regarding
the  direction  of the reverse  causal  effect,  however,  is  irrelevant  for  our  claim  about  the
independent  second-stage  impact of GSP.)  Hence,  the findings  in  models  1,  2,  and  3  are
not an artifact of endogeneity,  since the association  between  GSP status and protectionism
shows up even when controlling  for endogeneity bias in the IV models.
5.3  Other Measures  of GSIP
The third  set  of regressions  examines  the  impact  of  GSP Fraction,,t instead  of the  GSP
dummy.  This is a better measure of the GSP program as it measures  GSP exports of country
i to the United States (USITC  [2002])  as a percent of its total exports in year t.  Because the
time series  for Dutzes and  Tariff are frequently  interrupted and  GSP Fraction itself is only
31Distance and alliance data are from the Correlates  of War Project  as distributed by Bennett and Stam
[2000],  updated by the authors to 2000.
32These statistics  yield p = 0.548,  p = 0.446, p = 0.607 for models  4, 5, 6, respectively.
33Fit in the first-stage probit (of GSP on the instruments) is quite good in each case, all with large x2 values
and pseudo-R2s  around  0.5 or higher.  Thus, by  Staiger and Stock's  [1997]  rule of thumb,  our instruments
have  more than adequate explanatory  power.
17available for  the last decade  (48  percent  of observations),  we  restrict our  attention to the
dependent  variable  with the most  nonmissing  cells,  Closure.  We substitute  GSP Fraction
for  GSP and  use OLS  as  above.  Because  GSP Fractson is  a  continuous  variable,  our IV
method  is  now standard  two-stage  least  squares  instead of the treatment  effects  approach
used in the previous section.  In all of these regressions we expect GSP Fraction's  coefficient
to be positive, increasing trade barriers.  All use the same set of controls as in equation  (2),
again lagged by one year  (except  Landlocked).
Models  7  and  8  in  Table  4  show  OLS  and  IV  estimates  for  the regression  of  Closure
on  GSP Fraction. The  results  from the  previous  sections  stand  even  if we  adopt a  more
nuanced  measure  of GSP  benefits.  The more  a  country's  total  exports  benefit  from  (and
depend  on)  United  States  GSP  duty-free  status,  the  more closed  to imports  it should  be.
Just as expected,  the coefficient  of GSP Fractson  is positive and significant in both columns.
Dropping the average beneficiary from the GSP program increases  its imports by  1.7 percent
of  its  GDP in  the OLS  estimation.  This is  a  more  modest  and  conservative  impact  than
the previous results (models 3 and 6), because GSP does not cover a country's entire export
portfolio and because beneficiaries  do not rely wholly on the United States alone as an export
market.  In other words, the impact of GSP removal would be greatest  for countries like the
Dominican  Republic,  for whom  75 percent  of its  1990  global exports  went to the  US, with
13 percent  of these  qualifying  for GSP  duty-free treatment.
We should note  that the  Irend variable  (measuring  global  trade policy  patterns)  is  no
longer significant  in these regressions,  while all the other variables  maintain the same  signs
as in the earlier regressions.
5.4  Non-Tariff Barriers
Two  additional,  but  subjective,  measures of trade barriers  offer a useful  comparison.  Both
assess the overall restrictiveness  of trade policies, including non-tariff as well as tariff barriers,
grouping  countries  into ordered  categories,  annually but onily  for  the last  few years.  The
first is the International Monetary Fund's (IMF)  "Trade Restrictiveness Index"  (TRIX,t).  It
weights  NTBs more  than tariffs  (IMF  [1998]),  using  public  and private  information  at  the
IMF's disposal.34 With 10 representing the most protectionist policy (e.g.,  India)  and 1 the
least  (e.g.,  Hong  Kong),  the average  for our dataset  is 4.6.  The second  is  the trade  policy
component  (O'Driscoll,  Holmes, and O'Grady  [20021)  of the Heritage  Foundation's  "Index of
Economic Freedom"  (HF,,t).  This draws purely on published sources but factors in customs
corruption  as well as formal tariffs and NTBs.  It goes from the most open  score of 1 (e.g.,
Hong Kong)  to 5 (e.g., Bangladesh),  averaging  3.8.  In the fourth set of regressions, we test
how our  hypothesis fares with these subjective  measures  of trade barriers.
34We thank Anne McGuirk and Dustin Smith at the IMF's Trade Policy Division for providing these data.
35'These two  measures  are  only moderately  correlated  (r = 0.47,  n =  463).  Both are  likewise correlated
with Duties and Tariff only  moderately (r = about 0.6),  with  Closure even  less (r = about  0.25).
18Models  9  and  10  in  Table  5  give  estimates  (with  heteroscedastic-consistent  standard
errors)  of ordered probit regressions of TRI and HF on GSP Fraction  for over 100 developing
countries in several years in the late 1990s.  GSP Fraction  again has a statistically significant
effect,  increasing  protectionism  (higher values  of TRI and HF).  Holding other variables at
their sample means,  we find that moving from Brazil's  1998 export dependence  on US GSP
benefits (about 4 percent) to that of Hong Kong (zero) increases the predicted Prob( TRI,,t <
5)  by a  quarter,  going  from  0.39  to  0.49.  This  accords  with  the observed  TRI  figures
for  Hong  Kong  and  Brazil in  1998,  which  are  1 and  5,  respectively.  The same  change,
holding other variables at their sample means in model 10, yields an increase in the predicted
Prob(HF,,t  < 4)  by about half, going from  0.29 to 0.43  - where Hong Kong's and Brazil's
HF scores that year are  1 and 4.
(B  Examples
In case after case, we can see trade policy following the path of GSP eligibility and withdrawal
we have mapped  above.  Consider  (South)  Korea.  Prior to being  dropped in  1989,  Korea
had pursued a long, slow program of import liberalization,  having cut average  (unweighted)
nominal tariffs a little from the 1980s average of 21 percent.  In the five year period preceding
graduation from GSP, import duties as a percent of imports slid down  1.2 points as a result.
In the  four  years  after  being  dropped,  however,  Korea  cut  the  average  nominal  tariff by
6 points  (down to  8.9  in  1993),  so import  duties  as a percent  of imports  decreased  much
more  rapidly,  by 3.5 more points,  reaching a low of 4.4 in  1994.  Note that this occurred in
the absence  of any additional multilateral  tariff commitments by Korea,  since the Uruguay
Round was  not implemented  until  1995.
Samoa  offers  another  interesting  illustration.  RFom  1993  to  1996,  when  Samoa  was
ultimately dropped from the US GSP program, Samoa's imports as percent of GDP actually
fell 16 points, from  75 to 59.  After GSP withdrawal,  however, Samoa increased its imports,
up to  82  percent  of GDP  by  2000.  Similarly,  after  years with  a steady  average  nominal
tariff of 9 percent,  Samoa's government  announced  a wholesale  trade liberalization program
in early  1998,  designed to cut tariffs to zero  by 2010  (O'Driscoll,  Holmes,  and Kirkpatrick
[2001]).
Mexico,  too, is revealing.  The US graduated  Mexico from GSP in 1994,  upon Mexico's
accession to the North American  FRee Trade Agreement  (NAFTA).  This would seem an ex-
ceptional case, especially because Mexico in the early 1990s had,  according to most accounts,
already  begun a significant  program  of unilateral  trade liberalization.  However,  Mexico's
imports  as  a percent  of GDP had  not  increased  from  1990  to 1993,  and  in just  two  years
after leaving GSP it rose by over a third, from 21.7 to 30.1 percent.  And this was during the
'tequila crisis,'  which  witnessed  a severe  devaluation  of the peso  and thus downward  pres-
sure on imports.  Mexico's  average  nominal tariff, which  had in fact increased  a little from
1989  to  1994,  dropped 3.4 points from  1994 to  1999,  and its duties as a  percent of imports
19dropped  to one-third  of its previous  level  in this period  as well.  Granted,  the catalyst  for
this major import  liberalization was the desire for export  revenue in the US  market;  GSP
removal followed rather than started the policy change.  But this is an exception that proves
the rule,  since  Mexico  had  not liberalized  as significantly  during the  GSP period.  By the
mnid-1990s,  Mexico had finally  learned  the lesson that you have to 'pay to play' - a lesson
GSP status had obscured  for years.
The experience  of Chile  comes close to a smoking gun in support of our clairn.  Chile was
suspended  from the  GSP  at the beginning  of 1988  for violating  internationally  recognized
worker rights  as the Pinochet regime  stalled the last stage of democratic  transition  (Adams
[1989]).  Its GSP status was later restored in  1991, after democratic  elections  had occurred.
What  happened  to its trade  policy in the  interval?  Just  days after  the GSP withdrawal,
Chile's Finance  Minister  Hernan  Buchi  announced  that the  formerly  "sacred"  20  percent
nominal tariff would  be cut  to  15.  He stated  explicitly that  the cut  aimed  to lower  the
burdensome imported  input costs for Chilean exporters,  to compensate for the loss of GSP
duty-free status in the US market (Adams  [1989]; Frasca  [1988]).  Chile cut its tariff another
4  points,  down  to  11  percent,  by  the year  its  GSP  eligibility  was  restored,  but  made  no
cuts  for  the rest  of the  decade  (once  GSP  was  restored).  Imports  as  a percent  of GDP
went up from the 1986-87  average of 26.7  to the 1989-90  score of 31.3 (a level  Chile has not
since reached  even  now),  and  then, upon  GSP restoration,  down again to 29.6  for  1992-93.
The  decision  to drop  Chile was  essentially  exogenous  for  our  purposes,  yet  the  removal  of
GSP increased  and determined  the timing of Chile's trade liberalization,  and its restoration
stalled that liberalization  subsequently.
7  Conclusion
The aim of this paper was to contribute  to the ongoing debate on the best ways to integrate
the  developing  countries  into  the world  trading  system and  to lower  their  trade barriers.
One of the dominant views favors  the "special  and differential treatment of LDCs"  through
programs  such as the  GSP.  However,  this paper  provides strong empirical  evidence  against
such  programs  and  our  results  thus  indicate  quite  clearly  that  (a)  remaining  eligible  for
GSP makes  a country  less likely to liberalize its own trade  policy and  (b) the  GSP  "dose"
matters  as well,  i.e.,  greater  export  dependence  on  US  GSP preferences  boosts  a country's
resistance  to  liberalization.  These  findings  are  extremely  robust.  First,  the  estimates  of
GSP's impact on  protection  are similar  in statistical  and substantive  significance  regardless
of the  differences  among  our  five  trade  policy  measures.  Second,  the  results  hold  across
two different  measures of the independent  variable,  GSP  status: contrasts both  (1)  between
countries on and off GSP and  (2)  among countries receiving various degrees  of GSP  benefits
equally  support  the hypothesis.  Third,  the  GSP  treatment  effect  holds  up  if we  correct
for the potential  endogeneity  of US GSP  eligibility decisions.  There is  little option but  to
conclude  that the evidence  is strongly consistent with our hypothesis.
20These results  are quite  surprising.  After all,  the US is  not the  largest trading partner
for many of these developing  countries,  and most exports to the US by GSP beneficiaries  do
not qualify for GSP duty-free  status.  Other factors,  such as IMF  conditionality,  the overall
secular  trend  toward  liberalization  in  the  developing  world,  macroeconomic  performance,
or exogenous  characteristics  like geography  and market  size,  are  all given greater  weight  in
conventional explanations  of developing  countries'  trade policies.  Our results  indicate  there
is  merit in some of these explanations,  but the GSP program also has significant  influence.
What is particularly striking is that our results obtain despite the presence of several  pariah
states on the list of countries removed from the US GSP program - countries like Ethiopia in
the 1980s,  as well as Myanmar and Mauritania in the  1990s, whose import regimes verged on
autarky.  These countries  drag our estimates down,  and the use of an inefficient  estimation
method  leaves our estimates  relatively  imprecise.  Given  these considerations,  we have  set
up a hard test for the model.  Yet,  as we have  found,  GSP  actually matters in trade policy
decisions of beneficiary  states.
Is endogeneity bias responsible for the apparent association between GSP and protection?
We address this concern directly, and the answer is unambiguously  no.  First, recall that we
lag the GSP variable  by a year in the OLS models,  and, because the US GSP review process
actually  takes place  in the  12  months prior to the announcement,  there  is  an effective  lag
of nearly two  years.  Second, as Ozden  and Reinhardt  [2002]  demonstrate  using a discrete
duration  model  of time  till GSP withdrawal  for all  US  GSP  beneficiaries  from  1976-2001,
neither  the  state's overall  trade openness,  its openness  to  US  exports  in  particular  (as  a
percent  of GDP),  nor its duties  as  a percent  of trade  have  any significant  effect  on  GSP
withdrawal decisions, when controlling for other important factors.  (Rather, what matters is
the volume of its exports to the US and its per capita income, plus US-specific macroeconomic
conditions.)  After  all,  the GSP as approved  within the General  Agreement  on Tariffs  and
Trade legal system is not supposed to be reciprocal in nature.  To be sure, the US links other
issues to GSP status reviews  (e.g.,  worker rights),  but GSP is not conditioned  on reciprocal
market access  in practice.  As one observer  has noted,  GSP status decisions are  "controlled
essentially  by  importers"  (Wilson  [1992]).  Third,  in any  case,  our hypothesis  passes  the
truest test of this objection,  in IV models controlling  for endogeneity bias.
Several  factors  might  account  for  the  negative  effect  of the  US  GSP  program  on the
trade policies of developing  countries.  One of them might  be the lack of lobbying  by export
groups for liberalization,  since they face low tariffs on their exports in any case  (under GSP);
hence policy is determined by protectionist import-competing groups.  Another  might be the
way  the  GSP  eligibility  is  determined.  The  political  process  leading  to  GSP  decisions  is
heavily influenced  by protectionist  domestic interest  groups in the US.  Since 'he who giveth
may  taketh away,'  the  non-guaranteed  nature  of GSP  preferences  prevents  the  recipients
from fully focusing on their export sectors.  Developing countries in GATT/WTO have often
levied  the  critique  that  sector-  and  country-specific  'graduation'  criteria  are  "contrary  to
principles  of non-discrimination  and  non-reciprocity  that underpin  the GSP  and therefore
21alien  to the  original  intentions  underlying  the  GSP  concept"  (WTO  [2000])."  Thus  the
negative effects  of GSP should not be blamed just on developing  countries,  but also  on the
way  in which  GSP  is administered in US, highly  exposed  as it is to unregulated traditional
protectionist  pressures.  One of the  main implications  of our results is that participating  in
reciprocal  trade agreements  through formal institutional  frameworks  such as the  GATT is
more  likely to lead to liberalization by developing  countries.
As part of the buildup to what many have called the "Development  Round,"  i.e., WTO's
next multilateral trade negotiation, many developing countries have continued to lobby fellow
WTO  members  for  continued  and  even  increased  nonreciprocal  trade  preferences  (WTO
[2001a]),  in some cases explicitly pleading  cessation of pressure for any further liberalization
of their own  (e.g.,  WTO  [1999]).  Based  on the  evidence in  this paper,  we argue  that the
preferred scenario is one in which developing countries give up GSP in favor of the reciprocity-
driven trade regime embodied  in GATT/WTO  relationships  among developed states.  The
normative criteria here is the extent of trade liberalization  achieved  by developing  countries,
of course.  A world in which GSP is administered outside of the GATT/WTO legal structure,
exposing it to protectionist  political  economy  dynamics within  developed  countries,  is  the
least ideal.
Hopefully, our results lead to more questions than they answered.  Some of these questions
are  about  the  actual  political  economy  mechanisms  that  cause  the  effects  we  identified.
Second,  the links  between  GSP  status and  export  performance  need  to be analyzed.  Our
model has implications  for  how GSP affects the export  level  of a country,  but at the same
time GSP eligibility has been shown to be negatively  affected by export volume  (Ozden  and
Reinhardt  [2002]).  This  endogeneity  issue  is  crucial  for  correct  identification  of the  true
linkages  between exports  (if not import openness,  the issue here)  and GSP status.  We hope
to address  these questions  in subsequent  papers.
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Table  1. Descriptive  Statistics
Dependent:  Duties,,t  Tariff,t  Closuret,t  Closure,,,
Models  1 & 4  Models  2 & 5  Models  3  & 6  Models  7 & 8
8.52-6.22  20.18-15.13  -44.59-28.95  -46.28-26.81
Dependent  [0, 55.82]  [0,102.21  [-446.3, -1.2]  [-174.9, -1.2]
1987.3-6.5  1991.9-5.1  1989.0-6.9  1995.9-2.5
Yeart  [1976,2000]  [1981,2000]  [1976,2000]  [1992,2000]
0.95-0.21  0.91-0.28  0.94-0.24
[0,1]  [0,11  [0, 1]
GSP Fraction,,t-l  - - - 0.90-1.52
[0,14.79]
9.83-3.03  21.45-5.91  -45.42-3.23  -46.69-0.84
Trendt..1 [3.92,16.87]  [11.37,30.69]  [-53.4, -38.4]  [-47.7, -45.0]
0.41-0.49  0.51-0.50  0.41-0.49  0.48-0.50
IMIFt,t 1 [0,1]  [0,1]  [0,  1]  [0,1]
22.79-1.94  23.48-1 84  22.31-2.03  22.59-2.07
Log  GDP1,t_1 [17.9,27.3]  [18.6,27.3]  [17.1,27.3]  [17.4,27  3]
7.23-1.18  7.37-1.25  7.08-1.21  7.16-1.28
Log Jncomet,t.i  [4.51,10.17]  [4.59,10.15]  [4.44,10.17]  [4.44,10.17]
0.40-0.37  0.41-0.36  0.41-0.38  0 41-0.38
Land1ockedt  [0,1]  [0,  1]  [0,  1]  [0,1]
3.83-5.68  3.59-4.64  3.43-6.45  3.59-6.35
Growth1,  ..i  [-26.5,27.2]  [-22.9,19.0]  [-50.2,86.9]  [-50.2,86.9]
Countries  112  111  140  135
Observations  1503  821  2640  993
Mean-SD,  [Min,  Max]
28Table 2. OLS Estimates of Trade Policy Models
Dependent  Variable:  Duties1,t  Tariff 1,t  Closure 1,t
Model:  1  2  3
Method:  OLS  OLS  OLS
Years:  1976-2000  1981-2000  1976-2000
Constant  ~~27.118**  -16.417°  -127.215** Constant  (3.036)  (7.256)  (11.876)
GSPI't-,  1.663**  3.827**  8.458*
(0.481)  (1.189)  (3.825)
0.2768*  0.933t*  0.356
Trendt_..i  (0.059)  (0.082)  (0.203)
-0.521  -0.716  0.537
(0.367)  (1.038)  (1.028)
-0.148  2.806**  7.424**
Log  GDP 1,~.._ 1 (0.136)  (0.401)  (0.320)
-2.6798*  -7.014**  -10.564** Log Income 1,,...i  (0.226)  (0.813)  (0.746)
-0.342  -3.192  2.155 Landlockedj  (0.546)  (1.959)  (1.660)
0.052  0.161  -0.328* Growth1 ,t..1 (0.028)  (0.084)  (0.129)
Countries  112  111  140
Observations  1503  821  2640
FReq(GSPi,t- 1=0)  68  71  157
R  0.312  0.414  0.359
F  75.03**  39.38**  149.96**
* denotes two-tailed p < 0.05;  t,  p < 0.01.  Newey-West  robust SEs in parentheses.
29Table  3.  IV Estimates of Trade Policy  Models
Dependent  Variable:  Duties1,t  Tariff,,t  Closure1,t
Model:  4  5  6
Method:  IV  IV  IV
Years:  1976-2000  1981-2000  1976-2000
26.166**  -23.971**  -132.908**
Constant  (2.438)  (6.498)  (10.812)
GSPIt  2.298**  8.448**  11.846**
(0.766)  (1.482)  (3.961)
0.267**  0.885**  0.350* Trendt..i  (0.047)  (0.068)  (0.174)
-0.581  -0.948  0.328
(0.302)  (0.894)  (0.802)
-0.130  2.893**  7.483** Log  GDP1,t-.1 (0.102)  (0.340)  (0.250)
-2.668**  -6.683**  -10.416**
Log Incomeq-,t-  (0.169)  (0.669)  (0.572)
-0.346  -3.134  2.225 Landlocked1 (0.418)  (1.650)  (1.220)
0.051*  0.181*  -0.328** Growth1,t- 1 (0.025)  (0.078)  (0.119)
Countries  112  111  140
Observations  1503  821  2640
Freq(GSP,,t=0)  68  71  157
Model  x2 844.12**  365.74**  1791.68**
* denotes two-tailed p < 0.05;  **,  p < 0.01.  White robust SEs in parentheses.
30Table 4.  Effect  of GSP Benefits on Import Penetration
Dependent  Variable:  Closure 1,t
Model:  7  8
Method:  OLS  IV
Years:  1992-2000  1992-2000
-132.188**  -145.326**
Constant  (42.106)  (43.130)
GSP Fractioni,t-i  (0.68786)
GSP Fraction,,t  - (3.19293)
-0.390  -0.726
TEendt1l  (0.882)  (0.922)
-2.812  -2.656
(1.701)  (1.705)
Log GDP,,t-1  6.334**  6.081**
(0.556)  (0.577)
-10.453**  -10.184**
Log Income1 ,t...1 (1.068)  (1.047)
Landlocked,  3.808  4.366
(2.603)  (2.658)
Growthi,t  ~  -0.620¢*  -0.649**
(0.191)  (0.204)
Countries  135  135
Observations  993  993
Freq(GSP=0)  113  (t - 1)  120  (t)
-2  0.353  0.345
F  57.17**  56.064*
* denotes  two-tailed p < 0.05;  -,  p < 0.01.  Newey-West  robust SEs in parentheses.
31Table 5.  Effect of GSP Benefits  on Trade  Barriers
Dependent  Variable:  TRLi,t  HFI,t
Model:  9  10
Method:  Ordered Probit  Ordered  Probit
Years:  1998-2000  1996-2000
GSP Fraction 1 ,t-1  0.066*  0.102* (0.033)  (0.040)




Log GDP1,  t-  0.064*  -0.059
(0.030)  (0.033)
-0.319**  -0.448**
Log Income 2 ,t...1 (0.063)  (0.058)
Lanidlocked,  ~  0.111  0.004
(0.167)  (0.147)
Growth,,t-I  -0.004  0.015
(0.009)  (0.010)
Countries  138  120
Observations  386  546
Freq(GSP,,t- 1=0)  58  72
LL  -767.24  -716.29
Model  x2 62.72**  159.04**
Pseudo-R2 0.049  0.095
*  denotes  two-tailed  p  <  0.05;  **,  p  < 0.01.  Heteroscedastic-consistent  robust  SEs  in
parentheses.  Ordered  probit intercepts omitted  for brevity.
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Figure  1:  Trade Policy by GSP Status,  Country-Year  Averages,  1976-2000
The  figure  includes  141  (29)  countries  with  at least  one  year  on  GSP  (dropped  from
GSP),  for a total of 2466  GSP country-years  and 176  ex-GSP country-years.  T-tests (with
unequal variances)  of equal means across  GSP and ex-GSP country-years  for Duties, Taiff,
and  Closure, with two-tailed p = 0.00,  p = 0.00,  and p = 0.01,  respectively,  reject the null
hypothesis  in each case.
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